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Scope 
In recent years, large-scale renewable energy technologies (RETs) have become a mainstream 
investment choice in many world regions, including some developing countries (REN21 2015, 
International Energy Agency (IEA) 2015, International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) 2016). The 
most recent edition of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Global Trends report 
puts China, India, Brazil (the ‘Big Three’) and South Africa in the top 10 countries for investment for 
2015 alongside the more traditional developed economies (Frankfurt School et al. 2016). Largely 
driven by activity in China, and coupled with a fall in investment in developed economies, overall 
investment in renewables in developing countries outweighed that in developed countries. 
However, while these rapidly growing economies are currently leading the way, the growth of 
renewable generation is patchy across sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and south Asia (SA), with some 
countries performing well and others lagging behind. Many but not all countries in SSA and SA have 
renewable power targets and policy mechanisms in place at national or subnational/state level to 
encourage renewables deployment. This indicates that there is a degree of political will in those 
countries to encourage the use of renewables, whether for environmental, economic, access or 
security reasons. However, the actual uptake of renewable electricity technologies is determined by 
a number of economic and non-economic conditions acting as either drivers or barriers in addition to 
political commitment. It is important to stress that each of the countries in these regions has unique 
approaches to electricity system design, infrastructure requirements and available renewable 
resources; each country will therefore have its own individual responses to the drivers and barriers 
to greater renewables deployment. 
This paper considers the drivers and barriers faced by ‘large-scale’ renewables in electricity systems 
in developing countries in the short and longer term. By ‘large scale’ we mean here renewable 
projects that are connected to distribution or transmission networks, and which are therefore able 
to participate in power markets. This definition avoids setting a limit in terms of the total capacity of 
any individual project, but instead focuses on the ability to sell power, whether by contract to a 
utility or into a power pool. It excludes stand-alone, very small-scale projects that are off-grid, and 
some projects connected to mini-grids if those grids are not connected to the larger national 
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network (Figure 1). This paper considers the current state of knowledge in relation to renewables, 
specifically with hydro, wind and solar technologies and geothermal power.1 
Figure 1: Defining ‘large-scale’ renewables 
  
Different RETs have very different characteristics, both in terms of their impact and their operation. 
With the exception of large-scale hydro (often classified as >100MW2), grid-connected projects tend 
to be smaller scale than ‘conventional’ fossil fuel generation. Even at grid scale, wind and 
photovoltaic (PV) installations are often smaller, modular projects (e.g. numerous wind turbines 
make up a wind farm). With the exception of geothermal and biomass, they operate variably: wind 
and PV on a short term, day-to day basis, and hydro according to seasonal fluctuations in rainfall. 
The siting of projects is resource-dependent, for example where wind speeds are most reliable or 
where geothermal or water resources are located. This in turn requires grid infrastructure to be built 
where the renewable resources are. They also differ in investment profile, with high up-front capital 
costs compared with fossil fuel plant and relatively low operation and maintenance costs, including 
zero fuel costs (apart from biomass). The potential for modular, incremental investment means that 
renewable projects can be scaled up over time, rather than being built in one go as with 
conventional generation. 
The starting point for this paper is that electricity systems, as with other large technical systems, are 
complex and multidimensional, incorporating interrelated social, economic, political and legal 
aspects as well as the technical characteristics of the system. Purposive action to encourage 
1 Biomass is a widespread and often dominant fuel in many developing countries, but we have not included it for two 
reasons. First, because the operations of biomass power plants tend to reflect the operating characteristics of 
conventional fossil fuel plants, and so do not pose the same challenges to system operation as more variable plant. 
Second, because the broad sustainability issues raised by biomass burning for electricity generation seem beyond the 
scope of this project. 
2   There is no commonly agreed definition of ‘large-scale‘ hydro. IRENA uses a definition of >10 MW, while the US 
Department of Energy uses >30 MW and the IEA >300 MW. This lack of agreement reflects the fact that whether a 
project is ‘large’ scale or not is context dependent, both in terms of a country’s overall electricity system and in terms 
of the project‘s impact on a river. Non-large-scale hydro tends to be classified as medium, small and micro, although 
again there are no agreed definitions. 
Stand-alone
Mini/micro grid
Distribution connected
Transmission connected
Non-grid connected installations 
Independent grid networks (micro 1-10kW, mini 10kW – 10 
MW) 
Connected to the main national distribution network 
(1MW+?) 
Connected to the main national transmission network 
(10MW+?) 
NB: Definitions vary, especially on micro/mini grids, and are 
often relative to the scale and level of centralisation of a grid 
Study size 
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renewables deployment needs to acknowledge this complexity, by ensuring that economic, political 
and institutional conditions create an ‘enabling environment’ that supports the technical choices 
being made (IPCC 2012). Action and governance also need to be flexible enough to adjust to shifting 
conditions in the enabling environment over time. For example, increasing levels of renewables 
deployment may ultimately require technical and operational changes in electricity networks. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines some of the key strategic drivers for 
increased levels of renewable generation from a high-level policy perspective. We also describe 
some of the main policy mechanisms in place to support renewables in many countries in SSA and 
SA. However, the existence of these support mechanisms may not be sufficient in itself to deliver 
increased growth in renewables, as decisions to invest in any project are driven by an assessment of 
the conditions in the broader environment, which may or may not include elements of financial risk 
(IPCC 2012, Hamilton and Zindler 2016). We therefore set out the different factors that may 
influence an investor’s decision. The final section considers possible ways forward in policy and 
governance, both in the short term and from a longer-term, more strategic perspective. 
Why choose renewables? 
There are three key strategic benefits from encouraging the deployment of renewable technologies: 
energy security, sustainability, and economic development and competitiveness (IPCC 2012, Duscha 
et al. 2016, IRENA 2016a). Some key points relating to these areas are outlined briefly below. 
Energy security  
In the context of developing countries, security of supply can be improved by renewable energy in 
two ways: first, renewables can contribute to expanding access to electricity, for households, 
industry and business. This issue of energy access is particularly acute in SSA and SA, which account 
for 88% of the people estimated to be without electricity globally (International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) et al. 2015). 
Second, renewables deployment can contribute to security by reducing dependence on imported 
fossil fuels, although this has to be balanced against the fact that some renewable technologies – 
wind and solar – provide variable generation, which at high levels of deployment can have impacts 
on grid stability. 
Sustainability 
Renewables help to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions from the power system. Increasing attention 
is also being given to the local air pollution impacts of electricity generation, such as the emission of 
sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides from coal-fired power stations. The immediate health impacts of 
these emissions can be considerable: for example, around 590,000 premature deaths in India in 
2015 are associated with outdoor air pollution, and air quality is becoming an increasingly politically 
important issue (IEA 2016d). Again, non-biomass renewables can contribute to avoiding emissions of 
fossil fuel-related pollutants.  
As with any electricity generation technology, renewables do of course entail some environmental 
impacts. These can be relatively minor and short lived (for example, the visual impact of PV) to 
slightly more severe (such as the wildlife impacts of wind turbines). The most contentious 
technologies are biomass (largely because of land-use issues) and large-scale hydro projects, which 
can have significant environmental and population impacts (World Bank 2009). However, there are 
enormous untapped hydropower resources in both SSA and SA. As a result, there have been moves 
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in recent years to develop large-scale hydro plants in some countries as a way of driving economic 
development and limiting a growth in carbon emissions while also managing the social and 
environmental risks. For example, the World Bank and other development agencies have revived 
interest in lending programmes for large hydro projects in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
Zambia and Nepal. 
Economic development and competitiveness 
Finally, the creation of new industries and jobs for technology providers as well as the service sector 
can be a motivation for the promotion of RETs in many countries.  
As with any energy technology, the employment impacts of renewable energy are complex and 
difficult to generalise. Data can also be scarce for individual counties, and even if they are available 
can lack detail of employment at all stages of the full value chain of a renewable energy project from 
project planning to manufacturing, operation and decommissioning (IRENA 2014b). Furthermore, 
such data do not necessarily reflect the quality of the jobs created. It should also be highlighted that 
different RETs will have different employment profiles: for example, the construction of a hydro dam 
is likely to imply more construction jobs over a longer time period than a wind farm, and operation 
of a solar PV installation is likely to require less maintenance than a wind farm simply because there 
are no moving parts (Blyth et al. 2014). 
The relationship between renewables and other energy technologies is also complex. On the one 
hand, employment in the renewables sector is growing. IRENA estimates that direct and indirect 
employment in renewable energy globally was 8.1 million, with an addition 1.3 million employed in 
large hydropower (IRENA 2016a). Studies of employment in different energy sectors have tended to 
conclude that renewables generate more jobs per unit of energy generated than fossil fuels 
(Kammen et al. 2004, Wei et al. 2010). Blyth et al. (2014) estimate that investing in new renewables 
capacity can create one full-time job per annual GWh produced compared with gas or coal-fired 
plant. If demand for RETs grows as anticipated, countries with manufacturing expertise in particular 
could expect to benefit from the competitive advantage of being an early mover (Fankhauser et al. 
2008). 
However, on the other hand the increased use of renewables for generation is beginning to displace 
conventional (coal) generation in some countries with high levels of renewable deployment. This can 
in turn lead to job losses in the conventional energy sector and potentially higher energy costs, 
which may impact employment in the broader economy. Conversely of course, if renewable energy 
costs are lower than conventional generation, then the impacts on the economy can be beneficial. A 
key question is therefore not whether increased levels of renewables deployment can create jobs 
but whether they can create a net increase in quality, long-term jobs once possible losses elsewhere 
are taken into account. Evaluating this question definitively will require an examination of a range of 
variables, encompassing the economics of the whole value chain for renewables and other 
technologies in any given country. 
Given these knock-on effects on employment, it could be argued that energy policy – regardless of 
the technology – should not be based on the jobs created within the energy sector itself (Borenstein 
2015). There is an economic logic to this in the short term, but some countries are taking a longer-
term, more strategic view of the role of policy in encouraging growth and employment and 
incorporating renewables into industrial policy. This is discussed further later in the paper. 
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Technology costs 
Coupled with the recognition that renewables can deliver strategic benefits, the rapid decline in 
costs for some technologies means that renewables are no longer an extraordinary investment 
decision in many cases. 
Hydro power has been a mainstream investment option for decades in areas of SSA and SA. Other 
RETs are newer, less developed and often considered as riskier investment options compared with 
conventional generation. However, costs for these new technologies have fallen rapidly in recent 
years and in some circumstances they may already be competitive or very close to competitiveness 
with conventional alternatives, although this depends heavily on the resource conditions of the 
region and the costs of financing construction. 
The investment costs (per kW) of solar PV modules and wind turbines decreased by about 80% and 
30% respectively between 2009 and 2015 (IRENA 2016). This led to a sharp decrease of levelised 
costs of electricity (LCOE) from PV and wind power, and tariffs for PV and wind power below 5 
cents/kWh have been reached in many countries, for example in Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Spain, UAE 
Dubai and South Africa.3 The LCOE of RETs and of wind and solar energy in particular are expected 
to decrease further during the next decade, leading to costs of about 5–6 cents/kWh on a global 
average (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: LCOE estimates for solar and wind (2015 and 2025) 
 
                                                          
3 LCOE is a common metric for the cost of electricity. It includes expected lifetime costs (financing, construction, fuel costs, 
maintenance, taxes, any support mechanisms and incentives). These are divided by the project’s expected output over 
its lifetime. The results are adjusted for inflation and discounted. The use of LCOE as the primary method of comparing 
technology costs is controversial as the approach may unduly favour low capital cost technologies but high fuel costs 
over technologies with high capital costs but low or zero operating costs (such as many renewables). This can, for 
example, create a situation where investing in a small diesel generator may appear to be the most cost-effective option, 
despite the fact that it would expose the investor to volatile fuel costs in future. Other factors may favour renewables: 
for example, the LCOE approach does not include project risks, which may be higher with relatively new technologies 
such as renewables compared with conventional generation. There are also other limitations with LCOE, particularly 
the system implications of different generation types: on the one hand, projects with stable output may be more 
valuable to the system because output levels are predictable, while on the other hand, small-scale, intermittent 
renewables sited on distribution lines may have a value in reducing system losses, another factor which is not included 
in LCOE. The value of LCOE is only as useful as the data and assumptions used. Data on costs in SSA and SA are limited, 
so any projections should be treated with caution. While LCOE may be a useful way of comparing different technologies 
on the basis of certain assumptions, it is important to recognise that it does not present the whole picture. 
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IRENA (2016) 
The most recent data on actual project costs published by IRENA provide an interesting insight into 
the different installed costs for utility-scale renewables projects at regional level. In some instances, 
the costs for renewable energy are lower in non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries than in OECD ones (see Figure 2). This may be because of previously 
untapped potential now being exploited in developing countries (e.g. for hydro projects) or because 
of better resources (e.g. for PV and Concentrated Solar Power (CSP)). The key point here is that the 
costs of grid-connected RETs may no longer be the barrier that they were a few years ago. 
Figure 2: Typical Ranges and Weighted Averages for the total installed costs of utility-scale 
renewable power generation technologies by region, 2013/2014 
 
IRENA (2015) 
As a result, renewables appear to have an increasingly central role in the future provision of power 
in both SSA and SA, and while it is important to treat projections with some caution it is nevertheless 
worth outlining the current thinking about the role of renewables in the next few decades. The IEA’s 
scenarios for world energy developments up to 2040 are set out in its annual World Energy Outlook 
(WEO). The baseline scenario, known as New Policies, includes the policy commitments made by 
countries together with a country’s plans even if the actual measures to implement them have not 
yet been set out. The most recent WEO (IEA 2016c) projects that electricity generation will more 
than double in non-OECD Asia by 2040 and that, while coal will remain the largest single fuel source, 
renewables will provide just over one-third of generation (Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Electricity generation in non-OECD Asia (New Policies scenario) 
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IEA 2016c 
The growth in generation is projected to be even more dramatic in Africa (Figure 4), with output 
tripling from 775 TWh in 2014 to 2,118 TWh in 2040. Renewables are projected to provide around 
37% of total output. In both cases, hydro is expected to be the dominant source of generation but 
other renewable technologies, particularly wind and solar PV, also show a rapid increase in both 
regions. Other technologies, particularly CSP and geothermals, also make a growing contribution in 
Africa in particular. 
Figure 4: Electricity generation in Africa (New Policies scenario) 
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IEA 2016c 
Much of the growth is projected to provide power for industry in both regions. In non-OECD Asia, 
demand for electricity is expected to grow from 592 TWh to 1,313 TWh from 2014 to 2040, and in 
Africa demand is expected to triple from 52 TWh to 152 TWh in the same timeframe. However, 
despite the rapid growth in electricity generation in both regions, the goal of achieving universal 
access to energy by 2030 is not on track, with an estimated 619 million people without access to 
electricity in SSA in 2030, and 166 million in Developing Asia (IBRD et al. 2015). The IEA is clear that 
effective policies are fundamental to delivering an increase in access, and that decentralised, off-grid 
renewables are an increasingly viable way of expanding access (IEA 2016b). The role of policy and 
some of the major options currently in place are discussed in the next section. 
The role of policy 
Some countries have identified the renewables industry as a potential driver of economic growth, 
both domestically and through potential export opportunities. India, for example, has a well-
established ‘green’ industrial policy articulated at federal level that has contributed to the growth of 
manufacturing and deployment of both wind and PV. Largely driven by the government’s 
requirements for state-owned monopolies to implement RETs, India has seen impressive growth in 
renewables, with around 45GW of grid-connected non-large-scale hydro. Analysis suggests that this 
growth might have been even more impressive if it was not inhibited by a lack of coherent support 
for the manufacturing sector, a confusing policy environment and the poor financial position of state 
electricity utilities, which have combined to reduce the potential for renewables growth (Global 
Subsidies Initiative/International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) 2014), demonstrating 
that while ‘command and control’ policies can be effective, the enabling environment in which they 
are implemented also plays a significant role.  
Kenya also has a well-established economy wide strategic vision, with a dramatic shift in the focus of 
its energy policy away from hydro over the last few years, and a medium- to long-term strategic 
economic development plan (known as the Kenya Vision 2030) that includes exploiting its extensive 
geothermal resources. The emphasis on geothermal power and other renewables is driven by a 
number of factors, including a desire to increase energy access, drive economic growth, reduce 
energy prices and fossil fuel imports, and diversify away from hydro to increase security in an area of 
uncertain rainfall patterns (Government of the Republic of Kenya 2007). As well as providing 
electricity, the geothermal projects in Kenya are producing broader learning benefits for other 
countries in the region, with the establishment of the Geothermal Energy Training and Research 
Institute at Dedan University (Mariita 2015). 
On a more micro level, the rationale for policy support lies in the presence of market failures (the 
failure to cost environmental externalities) combined with the strategic value that may be associated 
with greater levels of renewables deployment, as well as the sometimes higher costs of new 
technologies, which create an argument for policy to encourage investment. A variety of policy 
mechanisms, regulatory instruments and planning tools are used reduce risk and the cost of capital 
for investors. This has contributed to the rapid decline in costs of some technologies due to learning 
effects and economies of scale, and the growth in renewables deployment has been driven in part 
by policies designed to give financial support and increased certainty to investors. 
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The most frequently used regulatory instruments in the power sector are feed-in tariffs (FITs) (often 
determined based on competitive bidding), (tradable) quota obligation systems, tax measures and 
investment incentives. Two of the most common support measures – FITs and auctions – are 
discussed below to highlight the degree to which the policy landscape for renewables is shifting as 
the technologies become more competitive. 
FITs are generally well suited to achieving a high level of investment certainty by guaranteeing a 
fixed price for each unit of output for a sufficiently long but finite duration. They have proved 
successful in encouraging renewables in many instances. However, the success of FITs depends on 
the prices offered for output – too low and little if any new generation will come forward, too high 
and the costs of the mechanism may prove too high for consumers or taxpayers to bear. The risks of 
prices being ‘wrong’ can be mitigated by ensuring that there is flexibility within the mechanism to 
revise prices as a result of falling technology costs or inadequate rewards. This flexibility needs to be 
transparent and well signalled in order to avoid damaging investor confidence as a result of 
uncertainty about the stability of the mechanism. One of the key advantages of FITs is that they are 
relatively simple for both administrators and for project developers. 
Another important aspect, which is closely related to the investment certainty offered by the 
support scheme, is its impact on innovation. The vast majority of the case studies conclude that FITs 
are more favourable for innovation because they allow for higher investment certainty and lower 
transaction costs. Both factors are particularly important for new entrants and for attracting external 
capital from financial institutions (Bürer and Wüstenhagen 2009) as well as private investors.  
In recent years, auction-based FITs and feed-in premium systems have become increasingly popular 
as a means of encouraging reductions in the costs of support by exposing projects to a level of 
competition. The auction process typically involves the government inviting bids for contracts for 
different technologies for a specified number of years. Contracts are awarded to the projects 
offering output at the lowest prices depending on the different technology. This shift reflects the 
falling costs of technologies and a desire to encourage a degree of competition in bidding for 
contracts, so driving overall costs down. Refinements such as pre-qualification criteria and penalties 
for non-delivery of the project help ensure that developers avoid the ‘winner’s curse’ of bidding too 
low to gain a contract and then discovering they are unable to deliver a viable project. Auctions are 
more complicated and risky than FITs given that they often require some up-front expense and 
project development without a guarantee of a contract being awarded. 
Although auctions have led to low prices and reasonable realisation rates in a number of countries, it 
is too early to draw general conclusions on their performance especially with regard to effectiveness 
on RET capacity expansion and economic efficiency. As many of these auctions were introduced in 
recent years there is no comprehensive analysis yet on actual realisation rates, which were rather 
low in some cases in the past (e.g. the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation during the 1990s in the UK). 
However, initial indications seem positive in terms of reducing remuneration rates. Auctions for 
onshore wind in Brazil and South Africa, and for PV in many word regions, including emerging and 
developing countries such as Brazil, India, Mexico, Peru, South Africa and Zambia, have proven 
successful in driving down costs. If this trend continues then auctions can be an important element 
to drive large-scale and low-cost expansion of renewable electricity in developing countries.  
Auctions are yet to be widely implemented in SSA or SA. However, South Africa has attracted a great 
deal of attention following several rounds of auctions for renewables output (the Renewable Energy 
Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme) driven in part by a broader intention to 
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expand private sector participation in generation. Prices for the contracts have fallen for all the 
technologies included in the auctions, in some cases dramatically: the price for wind power fell by 
50% between the first and the fourth round of contract awards, to become comparable to the price 
of new coal generation (Department of Environmental Affairs 2015). 
Countries in SSA and SA are increasingly adopting one or more specific policies to encourage 
renewables deployment (Figure 5). In practice, most countries will adopt more than one measure at 
national or subnational level to encourage the deployment of renewables (see Appendix 1 for more 
detail). As well as FITs and auctions, these other measures can include tradable green certificates for 
output, net metering to credit customers for any self-generation they export to the grid, and a range 
of fiscal incentives and public financing initiatives such as loans or grants for projects or outputs. In 
general, SSA and SA countries with higher incomes are likely to have more such measures in place 
that those countries classed as low income (REN21 2016).  
Figure 5: Major renewable electricity policies in place (2015) 
 
 
REN21 (2016) 
However, the existence of a policy measure is not sufficient to ensure its success; the way that the 
policy is designed and implemented dictates whether it is effective at delivering its aims. There is a 
broad literature on evaluation criteria for promotional schemes and policy instruments in the fields 
of environmental economics and policy (Konidari et al. 2007, Mitchell et al. 2011). In general, these 
could be summarised as effectiveness in delivering greater levels of renewable deployment and/or 
other policy goals, and efficiency. Ideally, the efficiency should be both static (achieving the policy 
goal(s) at the lowest possible cost to society in the short to medium term) and dynamic (the 
measures achieve continuous reductions, for example through innovation in the medium to long 
term). 
Achieving ‘good policy’ for technologies at different stages of development being deployed in 
markets with very different financial and operational arrangements implies that no one policy 
measure will be appropriate for all situations. Different policy measures are appropriate at different 
stages of a technology’s or market’s development (Kitzing 2014). So, for example, competitive 
auctions may be very successful in South Africa for wind and PV but may not be so suitable for 
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technologies at an early stage of development or in countries with a relatively underdeveloped 
policy and regulatory structure. 
However, the presence of financial support for a project is not the only factor influencing a decision 
to invest in renewables or any other generating technology. Support mechanisms can in part 
compensate for difficult conditions in the broader environment for projects, but they may be 
inadequate to overcome the full range of economic, political and institutional issues that can 
contribute to increased risk for investors. Addressing these factors to create a supportive ‘enabling 
environment’ implies a wider and more complex role for policy-makers and regulators intending to 
encourage increased levels of renewables deployment in their country. The range of different factors 
influencing individual investment decisions is discussed in the following section. 
Factors influencing individual investment decisions 
While electricity systems in developed countries have shifted toward liberalisation and the 
unbundling of vertically integrated utilities over the last 30 years, many utilities in developing 
countries remain as traditional publicly owned, vertically integrated, monopoly companies. Even 
where a degree of restructuring has taken place, the system is not yet fully liberalised but is instead 
operating as a sort of hybrid, possibly with some unbundling and Independent Power Producer (IPP) 
activity. More detail on this issue is given in the EEG State of Knowledge paper by Eberhard and 
Godinho, ‘A Review and Exploration of the Status, Context and Political Economy of Power Sector 
Reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America’. 
The different system structures have implications for who might be investing in renewable 
technologies and why. In a system with a vertically integrated, monopoly utility, technology choices 
will be made by that utility, either with or without political direction (the ‘command and control’ 
model). The choice will tend to be dictated by company culture, political concerns about access or 
security, and the availability of finance, either off balance sheet or as a result of international donor 
programmes. Most countries with this structure have not invested significantly in non-large-scale 
hydro RETs to date, often because of the lack of available finance. 
Having said that, many of the countries in SSA and SA have some degree of liberalisation in that IPPs 
are allowed to build and operate. Much recent research has focused on how to encourage more 
investment from these IPPs by ensuring that the ‘enabling environment’, made up of the wider 
economic, political and institutional conditions in any country, is sufficiently supportive to provide 
certainty about the return on an investment. 
Encouraging independent investment in the electricity sector is considered important because many 
of the state-owned utilities are financially challenged, through poor collection of payments and/or 
underpricing of tariffs for electricity (e.g. Bangladesh, Nepal, Ghana and others). This has the dual 
impact of limiting their own investment plans as well as reducing their credibility as signatories to 
power purchase agreements (PPAs) with IPPs, so discouraging independent investment as well. This 
seems to be the case in Ghana, for example, where the distribution companies ECG and NEDCo are 
so heavily in debt that they cannot meet payment requirements for their current suppliers let alone 
new renewable projects (IRENA 2015a). 
In the context of independent investment in electricity systems, investment results from a market 
participant´s individual decisions, which are based on their perceptions regarding the risks and 
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profits of a given project. Understanding these determinants at both a country and project level is 
therefore pivotal for removing barriers and deploying policies to enhance an effective and efficient 
uptake of RETs.  
At a country level, a large body of literature has addressed the conditions that are pertinent for the 
large-scale uptake of renewable energies in developing countries, including IPCC (2012), UNEP 
(2012), OECD (2007), Fischer et al. (2011) and Mani (2009). In general terms, the literature 
consistently outlines that, from an investor’s perspective, developing countries and emerging 
economies are characterised by a higher real or perceived general market risk due to less stable 
political, legal and economic conditions for investments in larger-scale technologies. From a political 
perspective, unstable political regimes in general or a lack of stability concerning fiscal, energy or 
trade policies can represent a major risk component for any investor, particularly those engaged in 
long-term infrastructure projects. Regarding the legal component, general risks can materialise 
through the lack of ability to enforce private property rights (e.g. higher probability of expropriation 
or theft), a higher probability of violation of contracts, less probability of ensuring compensation 
payments if contractual obligations are violated, and civil disturbance or war. Finally, economic risks 
such as macroeconomic instability (impacting the volatility of the currency exchange rate, inflation, 
direct foreign investment, etc.) can represent substantial game changers for the business 
environment. 
These risks are not unique to RETs, of course, and can affect conventional generation projects too. 
However, given that some renewables are less mature, less well understood by financial institutions 
and have different operating characteristics to conventional generation approaches, the impact of 
the perceived risks for RETs may be higher than for conventional generation (UNEP 2012a, World 
Bank 2013, Hamilton et al. 2016). The influence of this on financing and investment costs is 
illustrated by Wassbein et al. (2013) (Figure 6). 
Figure 6: Impact of financing costs on wind and gas power generation costs 
 
Source: Wassbein et al. (2013) 
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At a project level, Boie et al. (2015) present a synthesised conceptual framework based on a wide 
review of the literature of the main determinants for RETs’ diffusion from the investor´s perspective 
(Figure 7). Each of these four main categories includes several sub-determinants, which characterise 
the conditions in each dimension. It should be emphasised that the framework presented by Boie et 
al. strictly refers to ‘factors influencing’ or ‘main determinants’ for RET development in general, 
therefore providing a neutral perspective on whether influential factors rather represent a driver or 
a barrier in a given context.  
 
Figure 7: Main determinants for RET diffusion from the investors’ perspective (adapted from Boie 
et al. 2015) 
 
The following sections outline these determinants and their implications for the decisions of 
renewable energy investors. Many of the issues identified will be common to both public and private 
or donor investors. However, the degree to which they are significant may differ – for example, the 
public sector might be more willing to take on some project risks than the private or donor sectors. 
Economic and policy framework 
Existence and reliability of RET strategy and support scheme: Although the costs of renewable 
energy are falling, in many instances RETs remain more expensive than conventional fossil fuel 
generation at the utility scale (IPCC 2011). This shows the pivotal importance of the establishment of 
national targets and support schemes for the deployment of grid-connected RETs. As outlined by 
UNEP (2012), it is essential that project developers can trust that these incentives will remain in 
place over the lifetime of a project and that public institutions and the legal system are stable and 
can be relied upon. 
Relative remuneration level: The relative remuneration level refers to the average remuneration 
level over the lifetime of the project considering the risk level and support scheme, as compared to 
the actual generation cost. In the context of developing countries, the actual remuneration level 
might be strongly affected by capital intensity, which tends to be higher for RETs than for fossil fuel-
based generation projects. The cost structure of RET projects is characterised by high up-front 
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capital expenditure (CAPEX) and low operating expenditure (OPEX) requirements, and, as with other 
electricity infrastructure, a long amortisation time (15–20 years or longer). The cost structure implies 
a high sensitivity to the cost of capital, which is significant larger in the comparably hostile 
investment environment in developing as compared to industrialised countries (in relative terms, 
with elevated political, economic and legal risks). This can be exacerbated by a lack of access to 
cheap finance. 
Access to finance: Access to finance represents a significant economic framework condition for RET 
projects, in particular in countries with a poor track record on such projects. Financing institutions 
such as banks may lack experience with project risks, and will rather have a lower understanding of 
the project risks related to RETs and therefore less capability to evaluate the financing conditions. 
Additionally, project developers may also lack experience with RET-specific business and financial 
planning, including their awareness of funding opportunities. As a consequence, capital may need to 
be accessed at a higher cost. Lending to project developers in developing and emerging markets 
typically requires a higher proportion of equity relative to debt as compared to RETs projects in 
industrialised countries (IRENA 2012, Waissbein et al. 2013). 
Revenue risk: In some case, as outlined above, renewable projects may be as cheap or cheaper than 
alternative investments. However, this grid parity depends in large part on the design and level of policy 
support for the projects, as well as the degree of certainty that gives to investors that they will receive a 
return. In other cases, renewables may be a more expensive option compared with conventional power 
technologies. In either instance, the revenues of RET projects are strongly determined by the 
supportive mechanism´s remuneration level. Any chosen support scheme (FITs, premiums and 
quotas) bears its own individual, design-specific risks (Boie et al. 2015). In addition to these inherent 
design risks, support schemes are put in place by policy-makers, thus leaving RET projects 
susceptible to political interference, representing a strong uncertainty factor in terms of the lack of 
real or expected stability of the RET support design or support level. This is likely to be the case in 
countries with higher political risks. Investors require long-term, consistent and credible energy 
policies (IRENA 2012). Revenue risk may also be exacerbated by the difficulties of raising tariffs for 
consumers in some developing countries, coupled with low rates of bill collection, meaning that 
utilities in those countries may not be financially credible. 
 
Electricity market structure and regulation 
Fair and independent regulation of the electricity sectors: With many developing countries and 
emerging economies being characterised by state-owned, fully vertically and horizontally integrated 
utilities, legislation and regulations can create unfavourable conditions for IPPs to enter the market. 
Fully integrated, state-owned, monopolistic utilities can be reluctant to enhance the participation of 
IPPs and, in some cases, a hostile state utility can act as a barrier to new entry, as recently seen in 
South Africa where Eskom is reportedly delaying signing contracts for renewables output arguing 
that the contracts are expensive and that the power is not needed, despite also pressing for the 
development of new nuclear facilities (Burkhardt and Cohen 2016, Fieldstone Africa 2016). 
On the other hand, political direction for state-owned utilities to deploy more RETs has led to a rapid 
expansion in the sector in India, showing that if political will and finance exist then a ‘command and 
control’ approach to renewables can be effective. 
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Availability of reliable long-term contracts (PPAs): In addition to favourable legislation for the 
participation of IPPs, the possibility of accessible, transparent and reliable PPAs must be addressed 
by the overall policy framework. The duration of PPAs should be in line with the lifetime of RET 
projects (Boie et al. 2015). Following IRENA (2012), cases like in India have been reported where 
utilities have not been able to fulfil their contractual obligations as determined in the PPAs. In this 
context, UNEP (2012) also highlights the relevance of political risks, shown in the fact that large-scale 
RET projects (as opposed to micro- or off-grid projects) have publicly owned utilities as immediate 
counterparts within their PPAs, resulting in high vulnerability in terms of risks of political 
interference.  
This is not just an issue for developing countries: developed countries can also experience shifts in 
the policy landscape. A recent report by Cambridge Economic Associates (2014) argued that the risk 
for IPPs associated with changes in the policy framework designed to support renewables might be 
lower in developing countries than in developed ones, given that most IPPs are contracted through 
PPAs. Unlike shifts in government policy, contracts can be enforced in the courts, so giving the IPP a 
level of protection. However, this argument assumes that the utility (or the state) has the resources 
to fulfil their contractual obligations in the first place. 
 
Grid infrastructure and grid regulation 
Predictability and transparency of grid connection procedure: Large-scale RET projects require 
access to the electricity grid with adequate capacity to inject the power generation into the system 
(Polzin et al. 2015). If adequate regulation is absent, grid connection might be a non-transparent, 
costly and time-consuming process. This matter can represent an accentuated barrier in developing 
countries with monopolistic, state-owned utilities, which lack experience of and legislation covering 
IPPs. Additionally, developing countries might have limited grid capacity and coverage, while lacking 
technical standards and certification as well as operation and maintenance facilities (IRENA 2012). 
 
Cost of RET grid access: Accessing the grid might be costly. Boie et al. (2015) differentiate between 
deep cost charging (covering costs for connection and grid reinforcement), shallow cost charging 
(covering costs for connection to the nearest point) or super-shallow cost charging (no costs at all). 
In the absence of a track record of projects in many developing countries, cost uncertainties 
regarding grid access for investors and project developers might represent a substantial barrier to 
RET deployment. 
 
Curtailment and grid development: The ability to connect to the grid and to export power are 
fundamental to the economics of large-scale renewable projects. However, infrastructure 
construction or reinforcement to accommodate new renewables projects can lag behind the speed 
at which RET projects can be deployed – transmission lines typically take several years to construct, 
compared with much shorter timescales for renewables. This can create a situation where 
renewable plants are ready to generate but have no connection available, or where projects are 
connected but are constrained off (curtailed) in the event that there is insufficient capacity on the 
distribution or transmission networks to accept their output. 
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Administrative procedures for RET projects 
Cost of administrative procedure: Like every infrastructure project, large-scale RET projects face 
costly administrative procedures. Rules and regulations are in place to control safety, environmental 
impacts, health and quality controls, among others. Morisset and Lumenga-Neso (2002) present and 
analyse a database on 26 administrative procedures required for private investors to start and 
operate a business in 32 developing countries. The authors find administrative costs to be positively 
correlated with the level of corruption and strength of governance. Developing countries will thus 
generally face higher administrative costs than industrialised ones.  
Duration of administrative procedure: Similarly, the duration of the administrative procedure might 
be significantly higher in developing countries. Morisset and Lumenga-Neso (2002) find that it might 
take two to three years to set up a business in a developing country. When grouping administrative 
procedures into 1) entry approval, 2) land and site development, and 3) operational requirements, 
the authors find the highest time delays in the second category, land and site development. From an 
investor´s perspective, time delays directly translate to costs (opportunity costs), which are 
evaluated before any investment decision. Especially for wind and to a lesser extent solar PV 
projects, delays in the administrative procedure can represent a substantial risk factor (Boie et al. 
2015). 
Complexity of administrative procedure: Finally, the complexity of the administrative procedure 
might itself represent a substantial barrier for the development of renewable energy projects, which 
might be aggravated by lack of clarity on requirements, lack of standardisation of procedures, lack of 
clarity of responsible authorities, number of different permitting authorities involved, etc. With the 
comparative lack of experience with RET projects in developing countries, higher levels of corruption 
and lower quality of governance, the complexity of administrative procedures is thus expected to 
represent a significant barrier. 
 
Applying the conceptual framework to real-world experience 
IRENA has produced a series of country-specific renewables readiness assessments (RRAs) outlining 
both the challenges and possible future developments for RETs in the countries covered.4 The 
standard nature of the reports produced as part of the process allows a comparison to be drawn 
between countries. Using the RRAs, the reluctance to invest can be traced back to many of the key 
determinants identified earlier and relates to the range of political, regulatory and institutional 
factors set out in Figure 7. 
The issues and recommendations in RRAs conducted to date in SSA are summarised in Table 3. It is 
clear that many key issues vary from country to country. It is also, however, evident that some 
factors inhibiting renewables deployment are consistently identified. For example, clear policy and 
strategy, a grid code that explicitly incorporates variable power and allows RET projects priority 
access, and streamlined permitting processes for IPPs are considered to be central requirements for 
renewables deployment in the short to medium term. It is clear from the RRAs that the focus of 
                                                          
4 RRAs are a standardised tool for assessing the short- to medium-term actions considered necessary to encourage rapid 
renewables deployment and are reports intended to catalyse the process of developing a more supportive 
environment for renewable technologies in the short to medium term. An RRA is initiated and led by an individual 
country, and engages key sector stakeholders, implying a degree of political buy-in to the final report.  
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policy-makers in the countries studied needs to include more financial incentives for renewable 
generation and expand to include systemic issues such as grid operation and incentivising 
independent investment. However, it is also evident that there is no ‘magic bullet’ to create an 
enabling environment – the issues identified do differ from country to country, and effective policy 
responses will therefore differ too. 
 
Table 3: RRA issues for grid-connected projects in SSA 
Country  Economic and 
political 
framework 
Electricity 
market structure 
and regulation 
Grid 
infrastructure and 
grid regulation 
Administrative 
procedures for 
RET projects 
Other [1] 
Mozambique 
(2012) 
Need to clarify the 
legal aspects and 
timescale for 
introducing FITs to 
give certainty to 
IPPs 
Uncertainty about 
revenue and 
financing is a 
barrier to IPP 
investment 
EDM are 
undertaking grid 
expansion, which 
with short 
extensions could 
incorporate small 
hydro projects 
 
Clarify the wind 
resource on the 
coast and in the 
highlands, and 
incorporate the 
infrastructure 
benefits from 
distributed 
generation 
Senegal 
(2012) 
Framework laws to 
encourage RET 
deployment exist 
but need to be 
implemented by 
decree. The laws 
include provision for 
support 
mechanisms (FITs) 
 
SENELEC has no 
experience of 
integrating variable 
RETs into the grid 
 
Some early 
experience of RET 
manufacturing that 
could be further 
exploited; limited 
understanding of 
resource 
availability and 
meteorological 
conditions 
The Gambia 
(2013) 
Draft Renewable 
Energy Bill awaiting 
adoption 
Limited 
experience of 
negotiating PPAs 
 
No renewables 
standards 
currently in place 
for design, 
quality, safety 
and Operations & 
Maintenance 
(O&M), lack of 
co-ordination of 
research and 
development 
(R&D) activity 
Limited public 
education 
programmes or 
technical training 
programmes 
Niger (2013) Lack of 
engagement from 
IPPs in the absence 
of a national 
renewable energy 
action plan, support 
mechanisms and 
other institutional 
and regulatory 
frameworks 
No specialised 
office in charge of 
negotiating PPAs 
   
Zambia 
(2013) 
Policy currently 
emphasises hydro 
rather than the 
basket of RETs 
Complex 
negotiations 
about PPAs 
increase 
transaction costs 
and limit investor 
certainty 
The draft Grid 
Code needs to 
include an 
assessment of grid 
capability, including 
for variable power, 
and priority access 
for RETs 
 
Limited knowledge 
of RETs’ potential 
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Swaziland 
(2014) 
SIPA does not 
grant investment 
and fiscal 
incentives to the 
renewables sector 
PPAs are not 
standardised 
The Grid Code 
does not provide 
for priority access; 
limited strategic 
identification of 
areas for cost-
effective, high-
potential and high-
density RET 
projects 
  
Djibouti 
(2015) 
No clear legislative 
and regulatory 
framework for 
electricity 
production, which 
limits the 
participation of 
IPPs. Electrification 
initiatives have 
focused on urban 
areas 
Investment 
environment for 
RETs is weak 
A master plan for 
generation and 
transmission is 
being developed, 
but the country 
currently has no 
energy policy and 
no road map for 
achieving large-
scale RET-based 
generation 
 
Limited domestic 
technical expertise 
and R&D 
Ghana 
(2015) 
 
Distribution 
companies are 
heavily in debt 
and not credible 
partners for PPAs 
The Grid Code 
does not include 
generation 
forecasting for 
variable power and 
priority despatch 
for RETs 
Procedures for 
negotiating PPAs 
are lengthy and 
complicated 
 
[1] These are other issues identified in the RRAs but related to more systemic issues rather than 
issues impacting on investors. They are included here for completeness. 
Sources: IRENA 2012, 2012a, 2013, 2013a, 2013b, 2014a, 2015a, 2015b 
 
Unfortunately, there is no set of equivalent studies that have been conducted on SA countries. 
However, it is clear from a range of studies of different SA countries that many of the experiences 
are common between the two regions, with similar impacts on investor perceptions of risk (Asian 
Development Bank 2015, UNEP 2012). 
Measures to encourage the deployment of RETs 
Policy-makers and regulators have a central role in creating an ‘enabling environment’ for 
renewables deployment, by ensuring that economic, political and institutional conditions are 
supportive of the technologies, and of investors. This can be achieved by removing barriers to 
deployment, and also by putting in place measures that would support increased levels of 
renewables deployment and generation. This section discusses some of the complexities involved in 
making policy for future electricity system development, followed by some suggestions about how 
barriers might be removed and a more enabling environment created. 
Levelling the playing field 
Fossil fuel subsidies can impact on renewables investment in several ways. They can limit the cost 
competitiveness of renewable energy as an option by artificially lowering the prices of fossil fuel 
inputs, or electricity generated using fossil fuels. Subsidies can also have an impact at a systemic 
level; for example, providing subsidies to fossil fuels can reduce the funding available for 
infrastructure such as the grid, which might support renewables deployment (IISD 2014). 
19 
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that global energy subsidies in 2015 amounted to 
about US$ 5.3 trillion, or around 6.5% of global GDP.5 Much of this subsidy is related to 
environmental externalities, particularly global warming and local air pollution. The IMF’s database 
shows a wide disparity between the level of subsidy in different countries, and how they provide 
these subsidies, both in the nature of the subsidy and the product subsidised (see figures 8–11 
below). Unfortunately, the report does not differentiate between fossil fuel and renewables 
subsidies, although the evaluation of policy measures to promote renewables in the IMF’s data 
implies that the majority of the subsidies given to the electricity sector are dominated by fossil fuel 
(see also IISD 2011). In addition, it is worth bearing in mind that a proportion of the subsidy given to 
other fuels will ultimately translate into an electricity subsidy.  
Figure 8: Post-tax subsidies as % of GDP in SSA 
 
IMF (2015a) 
 
Figure 9: Post-tax subsidies as % of GDP by product in SSA 
                                                          
5 The issue of subsidies, particularly for fossil fuels, is complex and controversial, in part because definitions of what 
constitutes a subsidy vary (see IEA 2006, UNEP 2008, Burniaux et al. 2009, Ellis 2010, IISD 2011). For simplicity, this 
paper has used the recent IMF study (IMF 2015) as a source, in part because it is supported by a relatively complete 
country-level breakdown by product and by criterion, which includes SSA countries and most of those in SA. In addition, 
the report is explicit about the problems of estimating subsidies, and the degree of caution that must be adopted when 
considering the results. 
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IMF (2015a) 
 
Figure 10: Post-tax subsidies as % of GDP in SA (2015) 
 
 
IMF (2015a). No data for Bhutan, Maldives and Pakistan 
 
Figure 11: Post-tax subsidies as % of GDP by product in SA 
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IMF (2015a). No data for Bhutan, Maldives and Pakistan 
 
There are two complementary and interrelated fiscal approaches that could be adopted to level the 
playing field between renewables and fossil fuels. The first would be to remove or reform subsidy 
regimes that favour fossil fuels. The second would be to ensure that the environmental externalities 
associated with electricity production are reflected in prices. To date, these approaches tend to be 
adopted in conjunction with policy mechanisms to promote renewables. 
The failure of the market to price environmental externalities is a key part of any debate about 
energy pricing and subsidies. A variety of mechanisms exist, either in practice or in theory, to 
address this, and include carbon taxes and carbon-trading schemes. Both approaches could 
encourage investment in renewables but will require a realistically high price to be set on carbon in 
order to be effective. Carbon tax systems have not been widely implemented in SSA and SA, but do 
have some potentially attractive characteristics, not least the possibility of recycling the revenues 
raised toward development and access programmes as well as other social programmes or efforts to 
encourage more renewables investment. 
A more complex approach would be to implement a carbon-trading scheme, either on a national or 
regional level. The economic argument behind carbon-trading schemes is elegant, but the efficacy of 
any scheme is dependent on a variety of variables, in particular political commitment to setting 
realistic emissions limits and reasonably high carbon prices6 (Jenkins 2014). An emissions-trading 
scheme is also more complex to organise and monitor than a straightforward tax. At the moment, no 
country in SSA or SA is directly involved in emissions-trading schemes, although they may be 
involved indirectly through Clean Development Mechanism projects (International Carbon Action 
Partnership 2016). 
 
Capacity in policy-making and governance 
Renewables can contribute to realising the broad goals of energy security, environmental 
performance and economic activity outlined earlier, but it is important that this is done in a way that 
also mitigates or avoids the potential detrimental effects they could cause. This in turn requires 
                                                          
6 The experience of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme has shown that low fossil fuel prices, and undemanding emissions 
limits in the early phases, failed to produce sufficient long-term signals to drive investment in renewables because 
there was an excess of permits and the cost of buying them was therefore very low. 
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policy-makers to develop a balanced energy policy with an explicit recognition that there may have 
to be trade-offs between the different drivers, for example between delivering greater security while 
avoiding environmental impacts, or enhancing access rather than realising the economic benefits of 
exporting power. 
The case of large-scale hydro developments demonstrates some of the trade-offs between the three 
drivers of enhanced security, environmental performance and economic activity. On the one hand, 
hydro power can provide storage capacity to compensate for the variability of other RETs, but the 
resource is dependent on seasonal rainfall and in dry periods the security benefits of hydro may be 
limited. For example, load shedding occurs for up to 14 hours a day in grid-covered areas in Nepal in 
the dry season (World Bank 2016), while uncertain rainfall patterns have caused power shortages in 
other countries such as Ghana and Kenya. The impact of this might be mitigated to an extent by 
developing more hydro resources in the country or the region, but the risk of reduced river levels 
remains. 
Hydro power provides most of DRC’s electricity generation, largely from the Inga River I and II 
projects. The planned Inga III project in DRC could ultimately make up part of the world’s largest 
hydro complex, known as Grand Inga and with a capacity of around 4 GW. One of the primary roles 
of Inga III would be to export electricity across Africa, with over half of Inga III’s 4.8GW output 
destined for South Africa (International Hydropower Association 2015). A further 1.3GW would be 
sold to the mining industry in the south of the country, leaving around 1GW for the state-owned 
utility SNEL. Given the current low electrification rate in DRC (9% overall), this exceeds current 
demand in the country, but the plan also reveals the trade-offs inherent in developing such a large 
project, realising commercial and economic opportunities in SSA but without having the 
infrastructure in place to fully exploit the resource in the short term at a domestic level.7 
Governance for some policy issues may also have to evolve at a multinational level, implying that 
policy-makers will need strategic capabilities at the international level. This is particularly the case 
for hydro power, where river resources can cross national boundaries and the trade-offs take on a 
geopolitical dimension. Taken together, India, Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan are currently proposing 
around 400 hydro dams around the Himalayas, which could provide around 160GW of electricity. In 
addition, China is proposing a similar level of generation from Tibetan rivers, meaning that the 
Himalayas could become the most dammed region in the world (Grumbine and Pandit 2013). While 
the outcome would be low carbon electricity, if all the projects proceed there would also be 
significant environmental impacts, population displacement and the prospect of growing regional 
tension over water resources. 
Balancing these issues may require a level of policy expertise and experience that is not always 
available. This can include an awareness of the renewable resources available, the ability to assess 
and evaluate the security, environmental and economic impacts of pursing different options, and the 
willingness to make those trade-offs apparent. In other words, institutional capabilities are a key 
component of good governance for RETs’ deployment. 
Possible ways forward 
                                                          
7 In September 2016, the World Bank suspended its support of the Inga III projects as a result of the DRC Government 
taking the project in a ‘different strategic direction to that agreed between the World Bank and the Government in 2014’. 
The Bank did not specify what the strategic changes were. 
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As outlined in earlier sections, there are some very clear messages about the desirability of stable 
regulatory and support schemes as a means of reducing investment risk (whether in the public or 
private sector). However, there are also lessons about access to the grid to enable the projects to 
operate effectively, and also about market design – both of which impact on project finances. Much 
of the research to date has focused on designing effective policies to encourage early deployment of 
RETs and compensating for hostile conditions in the broader environment (Wassbein et al. 2012, 
IPCC 2012, IRENA 2012, Frankfurt School et al. 2016). Overall, much of the effort in renewables has 
been directed at increasing capacity in the short term, reflecting the short-term need to expand 
electricity systems in developing countries. 
However, as renewables become more widely deployed and economies of scale and learning effects 
are experienced, it is likely that technology costs will continue to fall and they will become more 
competitive options. The key question then is how to maximise the impact of this by developing 
stable revenue conditions to minimise financing costs and by ensuring that the system overall is 
optimised to accommodate increasing levels of renewables generation. In effect, this means 
extending the idea of an enabling environment from a technology-focused approach to something 
more systemic. This understanding has recently become a component of many of the more strategic, 
forward-looking information published by the IEA in particular (IEA 2008, IEA 2014, IEA 2016a, IEA 
2016b, Lund et al. 2015). 
Some renewable technologies (hydro, biomass and geothermal) can provide constant – or at least 
predictable – output in the same way as thermal generation, and therefore fit with the 
‘conventional’ pattern of electricity system operation. However, the technologies where the most 
dramatic cost reductions are being witnessed are variable and often smaller scale than more 
conventional options. These characteristics have significant implications for the future development 
and operation of electricity systems. This section considers some of these implications, and how the 
challenges raised by increasing levels of variable operation might be addressed in expanding 
electricity systems. 
Electricity systems with high shares of variable renewable energy (VRE) technologies like wind and 
PV tend to deviate from the traditional structure consisting of central generation units combined 
with unidirectional transmission and distribution of electricity and supply following demand. Instead, 
these systems are characterised by bidirectional flow patterns on both transmission and distribution 
networks, as well as variable output that needs to be balanced across the system. This requires 
increased flexibility on both the demand and supply sides, more active system management and, in 
places with high renewables deployment, it can also require grid strengthening (Cochran 2014, IEA 
2005, IEA 2008, IEA 2014, IEA 2016).  
The issue of how ‘best’ to develop electricity systems needs to be approached in a strategic way. For 
example, some key questions need to be addressed in order to understand the degree to which 
large-scale renewables might be appropriate as a means of increasing access, and some substantial 
challenges need to be overcome in particular with respect to supplying consumers in rural areas, 
which go beyond the general concepts for electricity market design and renewable remuneration 
schemes. In particular, it will be important to understand the ‘right’ mix of large-scale, grid-
connected electrification vs. small or off-grid, renewable devices in countries with low electrification 
rates and what benefits off-grid decentralised renewable generation might provide compared to 
large-scale installations. 
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Utility-scale renewables could offer some economies of scale compared with micro and off-grid 
solutions, but they would also entail the need for expensive network infrastructure to be built. In the 
short term at least, this might not be financially feasible for all developing countries, and even if the 
finances were available, the costs involved would largely have to be passed on to consumers or 
taxpayers, so potentially reducing their ability to access electricity services. In some cases, large-
scale renewables might not be the most effective or efficient option: the economics of grid 
expansion depend on an individual country’s population density, the tariffs for grid-provided 
electricity, technology costs and fuel costs (especially diesel), as well as the macroeconomic situation 
in that country. So, for example, the Sustainable Energy for All initiative shows very different optimal 
grid expansion patterns for Nigeria and Ethiopia, reflecting the countries’ differing demographic and 
socio-economic conditions (Figure 12; IBRD et al. 2015). 
Figure 12: Optimal split by grid type in Nigeria and Ethiopia, based on anticipated expansion of 
main transmission lines 
 
IBRD et al. 2015 
The impact of widespread VRE deployment on networks and markets is already being seen in some 
developed countries, which are beginning to experience issues such as transmission congestion, the 
need to export at peak generation times, and market prices that are dependent on renewable 
resource availability on a given day (e.g. Germany and Denmark). Policy-makers, regulators and 
system operators are beginning to address these issues by introducing measures such as demand 
management techniques (not just load shedding) and electricity storage, more flexible network 
design, and innovative pricing policies. 
The level of VRE deployment in most developing countries has not yet reached the level where the 
impacts are significant. However, India is an exception, and it is reported that grid connection issues 
mean that solar plants in the south are being curtailed as there is no way to export the power to 
areas of demand (Manley 2016). The problem is also acute for wind in Tamil Nadu, where peak wind 
generation occurs between June and September. At that time, there is about 1GW surplus power in 
the state but insufficient infrastructure to export it to other states. This has increased calls for an 
inter-state Green Energy Corridor to be built to accommodate the renewables output from the south 
by providing additional transmission capacity for renewables in the south and strengthened 
connectivity with other regional grids. This enlarged transmission area should provide a larger area 
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across which the output from variable renewables can be balanced (Asian Development Bank 
2015a). 
Integrating large shares of VRE cost-effectively calls for a system-wide transformation and for policy-
makers to create the enabling environment in which this can take place. Factors which can improve 
the ‘system friendliness’ of renewables project siting include (IEA 2016, 2016a): 
- Ensuring a mixture of technologies and locations is used to benefit from complementary 
resources and reduce temporal correlations of generation; 
- Power plant design, such as the use of wind turbines that are optimised for higher 
generation during periods of lower wind speeds; and 
- Using modern wind turbines and PV systems that can provide a wide range of technical 
services needed to maintain short-term grid stability.  
 
In addition, various market measures will be required in order to reflect the greater levels of VRE 
expected to be deployed. These include improving short-term power markets to allow buying and 
selling to take place closer to real time to accommodate fluctuations in output, coordinating system 
balancing over larger areas to smooth local fluctuations, and the development of market 
arrangements that put a value on technologies or measures enhancing the flexibility of the system 
(for example, consumers being rewarded for temporarily reducing demand at times of high system 
demand or low VRE output). Other measures to build markets around the characteristics of VREs 
include the use of storage, hydro power or electrical storage in new battery technologies, and the 
use of capacity mechanisms to provide financial rewards to non-renewable generators whose output 
might only be required when demand is at its peak. 
As more VREs are deployed, the issues will become more acute in other electricity systems. This is a 
particularly significant issue for developing countries’ electricity systems – i.e. those that are 
expanding – as there is an opportunity to develop the necessary infrastructure and market 
arrangements from scratch, rather than adapting existing infrastructure to accommodate new 
technologies.  
Designing these measures into expanding electricity systems and markets will create very different 
systems compared to those in most developed countries, which has been recognised by the Africa 
Progress Panel. Expanding electricity systems in developing countries have the opportunity to 
‘leapfrog’ the issues currently being faced by established systems as they try to shift to more 
sustainable models by adjusting the factors at the regime level that act as disincentives to deploying 
more renewables. Focusing on the drivers and barriers to increased renewables capacity will provide 
useful information and lessons that can be disseminated between policy-makers. However, if 
renewables are to become a normalised investment option for developing countries then a broader, 
system-based approach will be needed to create an enabling environment for infrastructure and 
governance to allow electricity system development to progress along more sustainable lines. This 
includes the need for a longer-term vision about system development and operation to reflect the 
incorporation of greater levels of renewable generation. 
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Appendix 1: Renewable energy and electricity targets, policy measures and incentives in place in SSA 
and SA 2015  
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SWAZILAND       
     
  
     
TANZANIA     
     
   
 
   
TOGO      
     
  
  
 
  
UGANDA    
     
  
 
 
 
 
WESTERN SAHARA       
     
  
     
ZAMBIA       
     
   
 
 
 
 
ZIMBABWE      
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
     
     
  
     
SOUTH ASIA       
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AFGHANISTAN       
     
  
     
BANGLADESH     
     
  
 
 
 
 
BHUTAN      
     
  
     
MALDIVES     
     
 
     
NEPAL     
    
     
 
 
INDIA               
PAKISTAN     
 
  
 
    
 
 
 
 
SRI LANKA       
  
   
 
    
  
             
 
Key:           Sources:       
   
 
 National or subnational target REN21 Global Status Report 2016 
   
 
 Subnational target only   Tables 4, R16, R17, R18, R19   
   
 
